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Introduction: Financial incentives are widely used in health services to improve the quality of
care or to reach some speciﬁc targets. Pay for performance systems were also introduced in
the primary health care systems of many European countries.
Objective: Our study aims to describe and compare recent existing primary care indicators and
related ﬁnancing in European countries.
Methods: Literature search was performed and questionnaires were sent to primary care
experts of different countries within the European General Practice Research Network.
Results: Ten countries have published primary care quality indicators (QI) associated with
ﬁnancial incentives. The number of QI varies from 1 to 134 and can modify the ﬁnances of
physicians with up to 25% of their total income.
Conclusions: The implementations of these schemes should be critically evaluated with con-
tinuous monitoring at national or regional level; comparison is required between targets and
their achievements, health gains and use of resources as well.










¿Son necesarios los incentivos para trabajar mejor? Incentivos económicos en
atención primaria
Resumen
Introducción: En muchos países europeos se aplican en atención primaria diferentes programas
de pago de incentivos en función de objetivos alcanzados.
Objetivo: El objetivo de nuestro estudio es describir y comparar los indicadores más recientes
utilizados en estos programas.
Métodos: Se realiza una revisión bibliográﬁca sistemática recogiendo las principales publica-
ciones sobre el tema. De forma complementaria se remite un cuestionario a diferentes expertos
en atención primaria de diferentes países de la red European General Practice Research Net-
work’.
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Resultados: Diez países tienen publicados sus indicadores de calidad (IDC) asociados a los incen-
tives económicos. El número de indicadores varía entre 1 y 134. En 8 países los IDC y los
incentivos están incluidos en el salario mensual del médico, suponiendo entre el 1 y el 25% del
mismo.
Conclusiones: Los IDC se basan fundamentalmente en el registro de determinadas variables
tanto por el médico como por el equipo directivo, aunque la validez de los mismos puede
variar según la fuente de datos utilizada. Los programas se monitorizan de forma continua a
nivel nacional o regional, de acuerdo con cada sistema de atención sanitaria y los recursos
disponibles.
© 2013 Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L. Todos los derechos reservados.
Introduction
Although medicine is a natural science it is very similar to
the arts. Both are focusing on human beings and therefore
it is hard to be characterized with numbers only. Measure-
ment usually needs numbers, but how could be the level of
physicians’ work measured? Why could it be considered as
good in scientiﬁc or practical point of view? How could it
be estimated by the patients or by other health workers?
Is it based on the knowledge, experiences, circumstances,
available resources or on other methods?
There has been an extreme, unpredictable growth in the
biomedical sciences in the previous decades. Medical knowl-
edge is continuously changing, developing and thereafter
getting out of date early.
Humans are examined, diagnosed and treated by humans.
How could the doctors be motivated for better work,
performing more efﬁcient and effective treatments and
operations? What are the best factors for motivation? Pos-
sible answers could be: satisﬁed patients, health gain, cost
reduction in health care, professional success and/or ﬁnan-
cial incentives.
The quality of care plays an important role in health ser-
vices researches worldwide for decades. But it is difﬁcult
to deﬁne and to measure. Quality has different approaches
from qualitative or quantitative techniques.
The quality of care can be improved by continuous train-
ing program, using the Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) or
the creation and of clinical guidelines and their applica-
tion in everyday practice. Assessing and evaluation plays a
pivotal role in the objective assessment and can improve
quality.1 The most commonly used quantitative measure-
ment tools are the quality indicators (QI).2 The quality
indicators were initially used for assessment of the qual-
ity of hospital care. However, a signiﬁcant proportion of
the doctor-patient encounters take place in primary care,
so there was a need for the development, identiﬁcation
and application of primary care indicators. The strategies
for the introduction of quality indicators are not effective
without understanding the factors required verify the history
of its development without transmission their use between
settings and countries.3
‘‘Pay for performance’’ was a new strategy regarding
contracts between doctors and health systems (initially
in Australia, UK and United States). Providers under this
arrangement were rewarded for meeting pre-established
targets for delivery of healthcare services. Also known
as ‘‘P4P’’ or ‘‘value-based purchasing,’’ this payment
model rewards physicians, hospitals, medical groups, and
other healthcare providers for meeting certain performance
measures for quality and efﬁciency. The American Medi-
cal Association (AMA) has published principles for pay-for
performance programs, with emphasis on voluntary par-
ticipation, data accuracy, positive incentives and fostering
the doctor-patient relationship, and detailed guidelines for
designing and implementing these programs.4
The ﬁrst United Kingdom (UK) experiment in pay-
for-performance (P4P) was the introduction of ﬁnancial
incentives to achieve targets for childhood immunisation
and cervical cytology. These incentives were associated with
a substantial rise in the achievements in these clinical areas,
especially among previously low performing practices. The
best known pay-for-performance system, the QOF (Quality
and Outcomes Framework) was introduced as part of a new
general Medical Service (GMS) contract for primary care in
the UK in 2004 (Table 1).5
This type of motivation become more and more accepted
and recognized by GPs, health authorities and professional
bodies. In the past decades different pay for performance
programs were introduced in several countries world-
wide. Also in many European countries different ﬁnancial
incentive schemes were implemented. 6 The European
Community funded PHAMEU (Primary Health Care Activity
Monitor for Europe) project developed indicators for com-
parison of primary health care systems in different countries
(structure-process-outcome indicators), these measurable
international indicators were used to monitor the quality of
primary care in 31 European countries.7EUprimecare project
was funded by the European Commission’s 7th Framework
Programme used research methods to describe speciﬁc pri-
mary care organisational models in Europe and studied the
possible compromise between quality and costs in each
model. One of the main objectives of the study was devel-
opment of speciﬁc clinical and non-clinical indicators.8
We aimed to ﬁnd those European countries where some
ﬁnancial incentives are linked to quality indicators.
Method
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Table 1 Domains from the Original Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) (2004-2006).5
Domain Indicators /areas Diseases / Conditions Target points (pt) / %
of total payment







mental health and asthma.
550 pt /52.4%






184 pt / 17.5%
Patient experience 4 indicators in 2 areas Patient survey and consultation
length.
100 pt / 9.5%




36 pt / 3.4%
Depth of quality measure A holistic care payment
measures achievement across
the clinical domain
100 pt / 9.5%
The literature search was performed with relevant
keywords. We used the following search terms: quality, indi-
cator, quality indicator, quality of care, healthcare quality
indicator
AND ﬁnancial incentive, pay for performance, incentive,
incentive reimbursements
AND primary care, primary health care, general practice,
family practice, family medicine general practitioner, family
physician AND Europe, European, European Union.
Two researchers (IR, LRK) performed independent search.
Different databases (Medline- PubMed, Embase,
Cochrane Library, Web of science, Google Scholar) were
searched for publications in English from 2000 to December
2012.
For the grey or not published literature we used the
Google and Google Scholar search engines as well. Besides
the above-mentioned sources we also searched the English
version of governmental (where available), scientiﬁc sites
to ﬁnd other relevant information.
An informative questionnaire was developed (see
Appendix) and sent to members of the European Gen-
eral Practice Research Network (http://www.egprn.org).
Responses of at least 2 members of each country were
expected.
Results
Fifty seven potentially relevant articles were found and
abstracts retrieved. After eliminating the publications out-
side Europe and the duplicates (n = 29), 28 articles remained
for further analysis.
Most articles were published about the QOF in United
Kingdom.5,9--13 Literature research resulted only a few arti-
cles (n = 11) from other European countries, where both the
ﬁnancial incentives and quality indicators were described or
investigated. Relevant papers were found about the qual-
ity indicator system of Spain14, Lithuania.15 In some papers
experimental or theoretical results were published. 16--18 Due
to the limited length of this paper only the most relevant
articles are in the reference list.
Questionnaires were sent via email to 44 primary care
experts, 30 of them replied (68%). The summary of informa-
tion we recollected and presented in the Table 2.
Ten countries were found and listed where primary care
quality indicators are used and combined with ﬁnancial
incentives. The number of quality indicators varies from 1 to
134, the highest in the UK, the lowest in Italy. In 8 countries
QI can inﬂuence the ﬁnances/salary of family physicians with
a bonus of 1-25% of their total income. Besides the nation-
wide systems, there were local experiments and different
regional systems mentioned in the Netherlands and in Italy,
respectively.
Discussion
Over the last decades improving quality of care in gen-
eral practice got an extensive focus.19 There were different
health care system reforms, policy initiatives to improve
the quality and strengthen primary care systems in many
European countries.6--8,14,19 Many of quality improvement ini-
tiatives involve the introduction of indicators, and there
attempts to enhance the quality in general practice through
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Table 2 European countries with primary care Quality Indicators (QI) related to payment.
Country Year of introduction Number of QI Main ﬁelds of QI QI related
increase of income
[in %] or EUR
(approximately)


























ITALY* 2010 1 Diabetes, *(different in 20
regions)
< 1%
NETHER-LANDS 2010 17-20 Diabetes, COPD 7% (local
experiment)





SLOVENIA 2011 20 Prevention, COPD, asthma,
diabetes, hypertension
10%
Although we got more and more experience and results
about the existing quality indicator and P4P systems, there
are still a lot of questions, further evaluation and research is
required to compare them properly and ﬁnd the appropriate
answer to the questions.
Are quality indicators needed for a better primary care?
There are differences between the European countries,
inﬂuenced by the health politics and priorities of the gov-
ernments, by national traditions, available resources, the
patients’ expectations and the situation of primary care.
The role of primary care is also different in each coun-
try. Primary care providers have more responsibilities and
tasks with more emphasized gatekeeper functions (in the
UK, Spain, Netherlands and Denmark) meanwhile in other
countries it is only symbolic (France, Hungary, Italy). Cor-
rectly established and organized gatekeeper function can
reduce the numbers of referrals and decrease hospitaliza-
tion rates among patients with chronic conditions resulted
in lower health care expenditures.13,19--21
What indicators? The selection and deﬁnition of indica-
tors is not easy; they should be based on real data and
should be independent from the health care providers, who
might be manipulating the results in order to increase their
income. Obviously, the choice of indicators could be inﬂu-
enced by several factors: the treatment protocol of the
disease, the measurable biological parameters, prescrip-
tion of medications and all the factors, which could be
followed easily from the documentation and analysis of the
patient’s pathways within health care system. Depending on
the source, validity of data may therefore vary substantially
within electronic medical record system (EMR) since some
items such as laboratory values are recorded automatically,
whereas the validity of clinical information mainly depends
on how physicians and their staff record the respective varia-
bles in the EMR.19--21
The quality of the incentivised ﬁelds might improve; the
non-incentivised activities could be neglected.
The valid and reliable data are not dispensable for qual-
ity initiatives, health service research and health policy
decisions; however such data, originally from primary care
setting are lacking in most countries.16,17
How many indicators? If there are a few indicators, they
can represent only certain aspects of the primary care
providers’ work. The implementation of too many indicators
can lead to increased bureaucracy and box ticking instead
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Italy (the lowest) and 134 indicators in the UK (the highest)
among the European countries in 2012 5. In the UK, where
there are the most indicators, there are opinions, that the
indicator system should be simpliﬁed to decrease the GPs
administrative workload. 12,21,22
How much ﬁnancial incentive should be given? The
ﬁnancial incentives are determined and inﬂuenced by the
employment form of primary care physicians/general prac-
titioners; there are self-employed, contracted etc. doctors,
with 2 main types of ﬁnances (capitation and fee for
service). P4P schemes have become increasingly popular
innovations in primary care and have generated questions
about their effect on improving quality of care, although in
some countries were not linked to QIs. There is no sufﬁcient
evidence that contradicts or supports the quality improve-
ment effect of ﬁnancial incentives.19 The effectiveness of
P4P is inconclusive, though some reviews reported signiﬁ-
cant effects. A participatory P4P program might stimulate
quality improvement in clinical care and improve patient
experiences with GP’s functioning and the organization of
care. P4P schemes need to take more account of broader
deﬁnitions of quality, as whilst they can have a positive
impact on incentivised clinical processes, it is not clear
that this translates into improving the experience and out-
come of care.14 Too low incentives are not likely to be
effective, too high incentives can cause unintended conse-
quences (e.g. data manipulation, ‘‘gaming’’/cheating). Our
results showed bonus between 1-25% of the total income
of the practice in Europe. There are different opinions, no
exact, universal percentage can be established in differ-
ent countries, but an increase of at least 5-10% could be
appropriate.11,16,17,22--24
Who should decide what to measure? In some nations
P4P/QI system implementation was a governmental initia-
tive (e.g. Hungary), in others it was a result of negotiation
between the employers, policy makers, health providers
and medical associations (e.g. UK), or it could be more
‘‘bottom-up’’ procedure, involving the target users (e.g.
The Netherlands).5,9,10,16
The development of indicators and ﬁnancial initiative
system should be based on broad political and professional
consensus. As there are lots of questions and different
answers, further research is needed to establish the most
effective quality improvement methods in each country.
Limitations
Obviously there are some limitations of this evaluation:
- -it is cross sectional study and presents only the actual
ﬁnancial practices of the European countries at the end
of 2012,
- -although governmental homepages predict many
planned, QI-related ﬁnancial changes in some countries,
they have not yet been introduced,
- -we did not perform detailed comparison of QI-s only their
implementations are presented.
- -there are differences in ﬁnancing in these countries,
depending on the economic situation and priorities of pri-
mary care. This comparison would require more focus on
cost-effectiveness and other economic issues.
Conclusions
The quality indicators with ﬁnancial incentives could be use-
ful tools to improve the quality of primary care and services,
if we keep the holistic approach of patients’ care and use
QI with other quality improvement methods.
The adequate number and ﬁelds of indicators and the
extent of the related ﬁnancial incentives could be essential
to develop efﬁcient QI and P4P systems. It is also impor-
tant to take into account the characteristics of the national
primary care systems.
Although majority of doctors in the primary care work
as a professional but most of them believe that ﬁnancial
motivation is important. All of the achievements of these
schemes should be evaluated at national or regional level,
according to the health care system and available resources
with continuous monitoring. This short and perhaps not com-
prehensive outlook for other European P4P systems can
facilitate the thinking of GPs, evaluating and improving their
daily work.
Study was ﬁnanced from departmental resources, with-
out any ﬁnancial support from other bodies.
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Appendix A. Questionnaire. Primary care
quality indicators (QI) in European countries.
The country where you are working:
The QI system was introduced in (date):
How many quality indicators are there in your country?
Are QI integrated in the computer software you use?
(yes/no)
Is there a direct feedback / real time warning about the
QI during the doctor-patient consultation or you get your
monthly QI report after a certain time? (yes/no)
Does QI modify your income? (yes/no)
How many (%) of your income is based on QI?
What are the main groups /subgroups of QI?
Where can I ﬁnd more information about Quality Indica-
tors in your country?
Please specify available (governmental, insurance)
homepage.
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